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Abstract 
 
Studies of “migration industries” have demonstrated the critical role that border-spanning 
businesses play in international mobility. To date, most research has focused on meso-
level entrepreneurial initiatives that operate in a legal gray area under a state that provides 
an environment for their growth or decline.  Extending this work, this article advances a 
taxonomy of the ways states partner with migration industries based on the nature of their 
relationship (formal or informal) and the type of actor involved (for-profit or non-profit). 
The analysis focuses on low-paid temporary migrant work programs – schemes that 
require substantial state involvement to function – and examines cases from the East 
Asian democracies with strong economies that have become net importers of migrants: 
Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. The conclusion, incorporating cases beyond Asia, 
explicates the properties and limits of each arrangement based on the degree of formality 
and importance of profit.  
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In recent years, migration scholarship has taken deeper interest in the border-spanning 
businesses that move people internationally. Operating for financial gain, these 
“migration industries” play a crucial role in moving people across borders and keeping 
them connected to home (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Nyberg Sørensen 2013; Hernández-
León 2008; Hennebry 2008; Lindquist 2010; Garapich 2008; see also Kyle 2003; Martin 
1996; Salt and Stein 1997). Hernández-León (2008, 154) defines migration industries as 
“the ensemble of entrepreneurs, businesses and services which, motivated by the pursuit 
of financial gain, facilitate and sustain international migration.” They encompass labor 
recruitment, money lending, trafficking, and legal, transportation, remittance, 
documentation, and communication services stimulate and facilitate migration.  
Gammeltoft-Hansen and Nyberg Sørensen (2013, 6-7) broaden the scope to include 
NGOs, social movements, and faith-based organizations – non-state actors involved in 
the facilitation, constraint, or assistance of migration and for whom financial gain is a 
secondary, though not absent, concern. In some cases, migration industries may serve as 
a complement to social networks, but in others, they replace family and acquaintance 
connections (Hernández-León 2013).. The critical difference between the two is the 
promise of financial reward – rather than merely obligations of reciprocity – that 
becomes an engine propelling mobility forward (Salt and Stein 1997). As such, migration 
industry actors have a stake in and perpetuate the growing commercialization of 
migration and increased outsourcing of migration management.   
 Migration industry actors may be regulated or unregulated, operate legally or 
illegally, or be formally or informally organized (Spaan and Hillman 2013), yet much of 
This is the version of an article accepted for publication in International Migration Review published by Wiley: 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1747-7379/issues  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23074/  
 
 3 
the empirical literature focuses on businesses that operate either criminally or in a legal 
gray zone.  Small van courier services, for example, may offer an alternative to the post 
office for migrants to send in-kind remittances from the US to Mexico while avoiding 
customs and other fees (Hernández-León 2008), and profitable migration advice offices 
may purvey combinations of legal and false documents to facilitate cross-border flows 
(Garapich 2008). State policies can create opportunities for illegal migration industries to 
emerge, or heighten the demand for those already in place (Friman 2011; Trujillo-Pagan). 
As many studies have shown, smugglers proliferate when immigration controls are 
strengthened (Salt and Stein 1997; Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002; Kyle and 
Koslowski 2001; Krissman 2000).  
 If migration industries can play a crucial role in moving people across borders, 
they are not an unchanging feature of the landscape. Hernández-León (2013) advances a 
migration industry “life cycle” to capture the dynamics of its growth and decline. Within 
this cycle, the state sets the conditions that facilitate or hinder industry development. His 
conclusion accords with many of the findings of the large literature on migration agents, 
brokers, and smugglers. When a government attempts to regulate migration streams, the 
limits it stipulates create opportunities – though not deliberately – for migration 
entrepreneurs and labor brokers to set up business. As such, they appear as an unintended 
by-product of state control (Salt and Stein 1997; Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002; 
Hennebry 2008; Krissman 2000), or ineffective state regulation (Spaan 2014). State 
programs that aim to reduce migration may impact migration industries differently: they 
can eliminate customers and thereby induce industry decline, or produce new demands 
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for brokers and service providers who facilitate migration outside the law (Hernández-
León 2013, 29-31; see also Trujillo-Pagán 2014).  
 Within the migration industry literature, the state typically establishes the playing 
field in which the action takes place. The terrain is often variegated: governments 
determine the limits of legality and illegality that create opportunities for migration 
industries to grow (Spaan 1994, Mahmud 2013, Kyle 2003). But in the context of 
reception, the state is not theorized as an active participant in their business ventures. 
Indeed, some suggest that the state‟s direct involvement in migration industry activities 
may be an anomaly (Hernández-León 2005). Studies that consider how destination states 
may engage the private sector do so largely from an interest in activities directed at 
halting migration. For example, states may attempt to stem migration industry growth by 
enlisting private actors to limit mobility by outsourcing detention facilities  (Menz 2011; 
Bacon 2005) or border control (Lemberg-Pederson 2013). As such, the state‟s active 
engagement with the dominant element of the migration industry, facilitating flows, 
remains unspecified. 
 The exception is research on sending states. Analysts of Southeast Asia have long 
observed the commercialization of emigration in the region (Abella 1992, 270-4), 
resulting in a “labor export industry” that works alongside state policies (Goss and 
Lindquist 1995; Lindquist 2010). The Philippines is perhaps the most striking case of the 
state working with migration industry actors to organize labor export (Rodriguez 2010), 
while in other places, not the effectiveness, but the ineffectiveness of sending state 
migration management can foster the growth of private migration agents (Spaan 1994). 
Migration industry actors may cooperate with sending governments when the supply of 
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workers outstrips demand. Studies of the Mexican side of the Bracero program have 
shown, for example, that local officials partnered with employment agents to circumvent 
bureaucratic rules and utilize the labor power locally before migrants departed north 
(FitzGerald 2008; Chávez 2009). Comparing cases across Asia, Hugo and Stahl (2004) 
speculate that a sending government can influence the labor export industry by 
supporting its growth, controlling its development, or maximizing benefits and 
minimizing costs in the interests of the nation. They suggest that direct intervention can 
affect legal streams, while indirect intervention may be used to influence undocumented 
streams. The findings across these cases raise questions about whether and how receiving 
states, too, may engage migration industry actors in implementing programs to attract 
migrants.  
 When states work with non-state actors to coordinate migration flows, the basic 
relationship is one of devolution or delegation, for the control of cross-border movement 
rests in a state‟s sovereign domain. As such, a principle-agent framework can offer a 
staring point for charting the territory. In it, an actor – the principal – empowers an agent 
to act on its behalf. Defining the relationship is a formal or informal contract whereby the 
principal does not merely grant authority to the agent to carry out a task, but can rescind 
it as well (Hawkins et al. 2006, 7). Typically, governmental tasks are delegated either to 
private firms or other governmental bodies, international organizations, or civic groups. 
Thus one can specify the mode of engagement based on two key dimensions: the nature 
of the contract (formal or informal), and the type of agent (private or civic/public). In 
basic form, four outcomes are possible, as sketched in Table 1.  
 
This is the version of an article accepted for publication in International Migration Review published by Wiley: 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1747-7379/issues  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23074/  
 
 6 
-------TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ------- 
 
 Delegation, however, carries risks. The interests of the both parties may not align 
completely, leading to “slippage” in coordination, and agents may behave 
opportunistically or shirk responsibilities, resulting in “agency slack”  (Kiewiet and 
McCubbins 1991; Hawkins et al. 2006; Pollack 2003). Not only does the act of 
delegation itself carry costs, but attempts to monitor the behavior of agents, limit their 
discretion, or control the outcomes of their actions can be costly as well (Weingast and 
Moran 1983; Pollack 2003). In the case of guestwork schemes, states typically adopt such 
programs to extract labor from a supply of foreign workers while controlling their impact 
on the sending society and ensuring that their sojourn remains temporary. Yet middlemen 
have little intrinsic concern in policing exit. If profit-oriented, their preferences point 
towards a high turnover of customers, as the rate of return they receive for handling each 
worker typically decreases over time. Both actors can have an interest in limiting the 
labor market mobility of foreign workers – states often want temporary foreign workers 
to remain supplements of rather than substitutes for local labor, while middlemen prefer 
to minimize transaction costs associated with workplace transfers (Surak 2013). As 
interests partially diverge, states will want to ensure that control mechanisms are in place 
to guarantee that migration industry actors achieve the government‟s overall goals 
(Hawkins et al. 2006; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, 22-38).  These concerns can serve 
as an orienting device to flesh out the dynamics and stakes involved when states partner 
with the migration industry.   
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Study Design and Case Selection  
To understand how destination states engage with migration industry actors to facilitate 
cross-border mobility, this study focuses on net migrant-receiving countries in East Asia: 
Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. The literature on immigration typically selects its cases 
from Europe and North America and has devoted little attention to destination states 
outside the West. The omission is striking given that immigrant-receiving countries in 
East Asia resemble the canonical Western cases on the key elements – strong economies, 
democratic structures, and welfare provision – that undergird many intra-Western 
comparisons in the first instance. As such, they provide a fruitful site for developing 
theories that might apply elsewhere. 
 The units of analysis examined are temporary low-paid migrant work schemes, or 
“guestwork” programs. To date, the literature on migration industries has concentrated on 
activities in a legal gray zone, as well as irregular or illegal operations. In such cases, 
direct state involvement, for example through formal partnerships, would be surprising. 
By contrast, legal migration streams offer the opportunity to observe a greater diversity in 
the ways that states become actively involved with mobility businesses. Indeed, one 
might expect migration enterprises or entrepreneurs to establish a stronger foothold over 
legal labor migration since decreased risks may enable them to offer migratory “all-or-
nothing package deals” rather than merely segments of the journey (Spener 2009).  
 Guestwork programs, as government-run schemes for the recruitment of labor, 
offer prime material for examining the roles – beyond simply facilitating migration –  that 
migration industry actors might play. In their ideal type, such programs grasp migrants 
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merely as labor power, which they must closely control. Their purpose is to keep 
numbers regulated, the impact on the receiving society minimized, and return ensured 
(Surak 2013). As such, three principal points of monitoring are guestworkers‟ entry, exit, 
and maintenance and mobility while on the program. For the state, labor brokers 
represent the segment of the migration industry of greatest interest as these actors – in 
contrast to remittance or communication services – deal directly with the issues of labor 
mobility and management.
1
 The following case studies therefore focus on the relationship 
between the state and labor brokers as the migration industry actors most closely 
involved with labor provision. The analysis addresses program structures and how entry, 
exit, and maintenance operate in practice. It also examines the resilience of the 
relationship between the state and the migration industry by investigating calls for change 
and reform.  
 The subsequent sections examine guestwork schemes in Taiwan, Japan and South 
Korea to analyze the particular mixture of private and non-profit cooperation that defines 
their management. The case selection provides prime material for several reasons. By the 
early 1990s, South Korea and Taiwan transitioned from authoritarian rule to join Japan as 
democracies in the region. All countries saw strong economic growth in the late 1980s, as 
well as rising numbers of irregular migrant workers. In response, all rolled out temporary 
low-paid labor migration programs by 1993. The schemes are relatively small. Yet 
despite low fertility rates and declining populations, the countries still greatly 
                                                 
1
 In addition, brokers may serve as the gatekeeper for access to other service providers by determining 
whether or not migrants under their watch can visit internet or telephone centers or which remittance 
facilities they may use.   
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circumscribe the possibility for such migrants to stay beyond their contracts – family 
reunion is off the table and moving into a new visa category is often prohibited. The 
similarities among the countries may be unsurprising given that the governments in the 
region are frequently described as developmental states dedicated to ensuring social 
harmony by protecting economic growth. However, a comparison within the region 
reveals significant differences in the extent to which states coordinate their programs with 
private actors and embrace market mechanisms in managing the guestwork programs in 
place.   
 The analysis is based on primary and secondary sources. These include articles, 
NGO reports, and government white papers that were examined by the author if in 
English or Japanese, and by research assistants if in Korean or Chinese. The author also 
carried out fieldwork trips to the countries in 2010 and 2012, and concluded an additional 
fieldwork trip to Japan in 2014. In Japan, she completed 33 interviews with government 
officials, business representatives, lawyers, NGOs, employers, migration experts, and 
migrant workers. In Taiwan, she conducted 18 interviews with government officials, 
advisors, migration experts, NGOs, brokers, and migrant workers. In South Korea, she 
carried out 28 interviews with representatives from government and business, NGOs, 
lawyers, and unions, as well as migration experts and migrant workers. Research 
assistants undertook follow-up interviews in 2014 and 2015 as needed. 
 
 
Taiwan 
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Though historically a settler society, Taiwan in the decades following World War II saw 
little cross-border movement. An authoritarian regime controlled the island, and the 
struggling economy with a GDP on par with sub-Saharan Africa rendered it undesirable 
to economic migrants. By the late 1980s, however, industrial growth and a gradual 
democratic transition encouraged the entry of irregular workers, estimated to have 
reached 50,000 by the close of the decade (Tsay 1992). To contain the increasing flows, 
the government passed the Employment Services Act in 1992. The first major piece of 
legislation to address foreign workers, the Act drew inspiration from Singapore‟s system 
that used employment agencies and brokers for controlling labor migration (Tseng and 
Wang 2010). Still in place today, it allows low-paid migrants to enter the country on 
three-year visas, renewable up to four times. Currently the program hosts around 550,000 
workers. They are evenly distributed between manufacturing and caretaking, with men 
from the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam working in the former, and largely 
Indonesian women taking up employment in the latter (Council of Labor Affairs 2014, 
0).   
 For more than two decades, the program came under the auspices of the Council 
of Labor Affairs (CLA), a cabinet-level office directly under the President that was 
upgraded to become a new Ministry of Labor in 2014.  Although Taiwanese workers are 
its primary concern, it also determines the number of foreign workers admitted to the 
country and the sectors where they can be sent. The agency carries out case-by-case 
analyses of the labor needs of relevant sectors and grants employers permission to hire 
foreigners to fill up to 35% of their workforce.   
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 Though the Ministry of Labor sets the policies and parameters of the program, it 
delegates implementation to licensed labor brokers. The choice to partner with the 
migration industry was strategic. In the words of one policy expert involved in 
developing the program, “We were dealing with Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines 
– corrupt states you can‟t trust. We turned to the private sector because the market is far 
more efficient.” To obtain a two-year permit, a broker must be legally filed as a company, 
have no legal violations, pay a monthly fee to the government, and follow the fee 
structure established by the Ministry of Labor that details the services that they must 
offer, including placement, registration, counseling, tests, transportation (see Chan 1999; 
Council of Labor Affairs 2014). Enforcement, however, is lax, and brokers are well 
known for collecting two or three times the legal limits (Wang and Belanger 2007; Wang 
and Belanger 2011). With substantial profits to be made, the number brokerage firms, 
now 1300, has doubled over the past ten years, as reported in interviews with the 
Ministry of Labor.
2
 Dominating the field are around twenty large companies with more 
than one hundred employees that focus on supplying workers – both Taiwanese and 
foreign – to big businesses. Surrounding them are several hundred mid-sized operations 
with more limited staff and in some cases overseas offices. Firms of this size can still 
demonstrate the $150,000
3
 in capital required by the government for licensing. Operating 
in a gray zone are individual brokers with little more than a cell phone, though their 
numbers are thought to be diminishing from government crack downs on fly-by-night 
operations. The industry has grown with the increase in foreign workers. In 2007, the 
                                                 
2
 Lan (2007, 260) counts 600 licensed brokers.    
3
 All dollar figures represent US dollars.   
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CLA lifted maximum limits in order to “open the labor market,” according to its director, 
and the agency has since moved system of sliding formulas, with final figures determined 
by the employment needs of a particular sector. However, as the Ministry of Labor is 
charged with protecting local labor as well, it keeps overall numbers low, which 
heightens competition among the brokers to handle the limited cases, and for employers – 
particularly in construction – to compete for limited slots to hire workers (Lan 2007; see 
also Tierney 2007).   
 
 
Program Implementation 
Entrance  
Within Taiwan, brokers manage nearly all stages of the entrance process. Employers 
apply to the Ministry of Labor for permission to hire a foreign worker. If the application 
is successful, the Ministry issues a “job order” that the employer sells on to a broker for 
upwards of $2,000. Brokers compete among themselves for the opportunity to handle 
these lucrative orders by promising better services than their competitors. The agent 
transfers the job order to a partner in the sending country – either a subsidiary firm of the 
Taiwanese agency, or an independent business affiliate – which are often licensed 
through the sending country‟s labor export program (see also Wang and Bélanger 2011). 
To recover the initial expenditure, the broker collects placement fees from the migrant 
worker amounting to $5,000 to $6,000, which it splits with the affiliate in the sending 
country.  Brokers meet the foreign laborers at the international airport in Taipei, where 
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they process the necessary forms, oversee their initial health and criminal record checks, 
and load them into vans for transportation to their the job sites (Tseng and Wang 2010).   
 
Program participation 
Brokers handle day-to-day management and on-going paperwork requirements, including 
housing arrangements, regular medical checks, insurance forms, and visa renewals. By 
law, the agents receive a monthly fee from migrants in compensation, set at 10% of 
wages, or between $50 and $60, but it is not unusual to charge up to three times this 
amount in practice. From the placement and maintenance fees, brokers typically earn 
about $6,000 per migrant over the course of three years (Ku 2013).
4
 In response, the 
government has cracked down on skyrocketing fees as “market distortions” that squeeze 
too much from workers, and requires that fees are collected only after services provided 
(Council of Labor Affairs 2014, 2-3). Nonetheless, the workers remain, on the whole, 
heavily indebted. As a result, they have little leverage against their employers in the face 
of labor contract violations and workplace problems, which commonly include 
inadequate housing, harassment, injuries, and uncompensated work, and trafficking 
problems (U.S. Department of State 2014, 368-9).   
 
Exit 
The state charges brokers with ensuring that guestworkers return at the end of their 
contracts, and requires each brokerage firm to leave a $30,000 deposit with the 
                                                 
4
 For a detailed examination of the cost structure in the early to mid-2000s, see Wang and Bélanger (2007; 
2011).  
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government to cover the costs of deporting runaway migrants.
5
 The sizeable sum presents 
an effective incentive for brokers to ensure that workers do not leave the program for 
irregular work and that they return home at the end of their visa. To aid brokers with 
monitoring, the government allows them to retain up to 30% of a migrant‟s monthly 
earnings, paid only upon their return home. Such deposit structures have been largely 
effective in stemming “runaways,” with less than 5% of program participants illegally 
leaving the program annually, according to government sources (Lee 2010). Of these, 
deportations are high since brokers go to great lengths – contacting the family in the 
sending country, for example – to avoid losing the deposit left with the government. 
Indeed, it is only when then the agent returns the boarding slip validated by an airline that 
the money is released, and an employer can hire another worker (Tseng and Wang 2010).   
 
Resilience and Reform 
The Ministry of Labor, in close partnership with the migration industry, readily embraces 
the putative efficiency of market mechanisms and operates its system around a calculus 
of profit, loss, and competition. Indeed, the market logic is so deeply embedded that it is 
even extended to the reforms of the program. After heavy criticism of abuse by brokers, 
the CLA began an incentive system in 2007 based on smart consumer shopping.  The 
purpose was to “institute a market exit mechanism” for brokers and “effective[ly] 
administer and enhance brokerage service quality” (Council of Labor Affairs 2014: 5). 
                                                 
5
 The amount is stipulated in the Regulations for Permission and Supervision of Private Employment 
Services, Ministry of Labor, 2014.  Withholding up to 30% of a migrant‟s monthly earnings was also once 
used to discourage departure into the irregular labor market, but strong criticism led to its abolition.    
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Since its inception, each employment agency is ranked on a scale from A to C.  Around 
25% obtain an A grade on an annual basis. Those that receive a C are given two years to 
improve or lose their license.  This largely impotent threat slashes only about ten firms 
each year – just over 1% of those in the business.     
 When brokers extract illegally high fees from migrants, direct hiring offers a 
possible solution to growing costs by allowing employers to circumvent middlemen. The 
Taiwanese government has long avoided this option due to the resources it saves by 
outsourcing policy implementation to the private sector (Tierney 2007, 222).  Still, in 
2007 it yielded to NGO and international pressure and rolled out a direct hiring channel, 
but with little impact. Though employers may now bypass brokers, more than 90% 
choose to retain them for the paperwork required to hire migrant workers is so 
cumbersome that most are keen to leave the task to others (Tseng and Wang 2010). The 
organizations that use direct hiring are, according to Ministry of Labor officials, 
predominantly large businesses whose substantial internal bureaucracies process the 
paperwork involved.   
 The government maintains that foreign workers should be admitted only if they 
are supplements to rather than substitutes for the local labor force. With youth 
unemployment on the rise, such claims have become more difficult to sustain.  Yet the 
MOL continues with the current framework. Most recently, it has proposed an increase in 
the “employment stabilization fees” it charges to employers, ostensibly to improve work 
conditions in the service sector with the hope of attracting recent university graduates. It 
has also debated expanding the program to include care workers as a part of 
comprehensive health insurance reform. The continued expansion seems viable for a 
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system organized through a direct contractual relationship between the government and 
the labor brokers that implement the program. The hallmark of the scheme, almost 
entirely devolved to the private sector, is its coordination through a competitive market 
and driven by concerns of profit and loss – a logic that extends even to its reforms.   
 
Japan 
In contrast to Taiwan‟s formal guestwork program, Japan‟s scheme operates though a 
hazy distinction between apprenticeship and work. Officially, Japan does not allow low-
paid labor migration, but in practice its Technical Intern Training Program (TITP) serves 
the same function, and its origins and development over time suggest that labor migration 
is indeed its intent.
 6
  Immigration law reform in 1990 enabled the expansion of an 
existent channel, and by 1993 a technical internship program was added, forming the 
TITP. Regularly adjusted since, the scheme currently enables around 150,000 trainees, 
predominantly from China, to work for up to three years in 44 occupations, largely in 
textiles, food processing, agriculture, and metalwork.
7
 The government stipulates no 
absolute limit on the number accepted, but creates a ceiling by constraining the 
proportion of trainees to no more than 5% of employees in a company.  
                                                 
6
 In addition to the trainees, about 105,000 Japanese-Brazilians work in Japan, typically in skilled assembly 
or service sector jobs (Yamada 2010). With no employment restrictions on their visas and unlimited 
renewal possible, they have free access to the labor market. As neither their stay nor their labor market 
access is limited, I exclude the Japanese-Brazilians and other “Nikkei” populations from the present 
analysis of temporary labor migration schemes.  On the history of the reform, see Akashi (2010, 106-115).   
7
 Until 2010, the categories “trainee” and “intern” were distinguished by the application of labor laws – 
trainees were to earn at least minimum wage.   
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 The program developed out of an intra-company transfer scheme established in 
the 1950s to allow small numbers of workers from overseas branches of Japanese firms to 
train at the home base.
8
  For several decades, this lightly regulated channel lay open only 
to large enterprises with offices abroad. In the early 1970s, small- and medium-sized 
businesses called programs to allow in low-paid labor, but their efforts were stifled by the 
Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Labor (Chiavacci 2011), and soon made moot by the 
1973 oil crisis. A booming economy in the 1980s saw the same calls emerge, along with 
growing numbers of irregular workers, and again business interests pressed the 
government for a scheme to allow low-paid migrants workers on a temporary basis. The 
Ministry of Justice – the final voice on migration control – acted, but not through radical 
alterations; countering alternative proposals, it retained the policy of admitting no 
unskilled workers. The result was the expansion of channels for trainees. This concession 
to small- and medium-sized businesses was based on the older trainee system, which was 
broadened in 1991, and capped with a “technical intern” channel to form the TITP in 
1993 (see Nakagawa 2003; Chiavacci 2011; Milly 2014, 62-66; Oishi 1995; Kajita 2002). 
The program was established through administrative reform, which creates a wide berth 
for reinterpretation based on recommendations rather than legally binding strictures.  The 
result has produced difficulties in enforcement.    
                                                 
8
 The Colombo Plan of 1954 opened the possibility for such intra-company transfers.  In the 1960s, several 
thousand trainees from South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia came through this channel 
to take up semi-skilled and unskilled work (Ochiai 1975). In the two decades between 1954 and 1977, 
48,000 trainees entered the country, largely under the guidance of JICA.  By 1982, there were 10,000 intra-
company trainees, which grew to 23,000 by 1988 (Kantō Bengoshikai Rengōkai 1990, 192).  On the 
expansion of such trainee programs into work programs under the TITP, see Shimada (1994, 68-72).  
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 To implement the scheme, the government established the Japan International 
Training Cooperation Organization (JITCO), a non-profit quasi-governmental 
organization run under the auspices of five ministries and with input from the big 
business federation Keidanren. The organization offers support to firms, navigating the 
tangle of bureaucratic procedures, to comply with program stipulations. As large 
businesses continue to hire trainees through intra-company transfer, JITCO targets small- 
and medium-sized firms, which lack the administrative resources or interest to handle the 
paperwork on their own. As such, the organization assists the employers of about 90% of 
the trainees coming to Japan.
9
 For its services, firms pay between $500 and $3,000 in 
annual membership fees, in addition to a smaller cost for each migrant employed – lower 
total costs than going through independent lawyers. A significant portion of JITCO‟s 
funds comes from the qualification tests it administers to all trainees – a simple exercise 
that almost all participants pass (Daily Yomiuri 2006; Uemoto 2009).
10
  Nearly 20,000 
employers, dubbed “implementing organizations” in JITCO‟s terminology, participate in 
the scheme (Kokusai Kenshū Kyōryoku Kikō 2011). 
 While JITCO operates as a service for employers and provides them with legal 
assistance, tests, and insurance, “supervising organizations” handle issues concerning the 
migrant workers themselves and the bulk of the program implementation. These 
establishments must be licensed by the government as an employment agency and 
operate as a non-profit, at least on paper. Agricultural associations, vocational training 
companies, and chambers of commerce may apply to become “supervising 
                                                 
9
 See Kokusai Kenshū Kyōryoku Kikō (2011) for comprehensive statistics.  
10
 On the program implementation and structure, see Moriya (2011, 142-3), Akashi (2010, 106-115).  
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organizations,” but the bulk are represented by “small business associations” of five or 
more firms. Typically, a handful of brokers band together to form a dummy firm that they 
register with the local government as a business association. In some instances, broker 
agencies from sending countries, in order to dispatch workers directly, have established 
shell companies in Japan and registered them as supervising organizations as well 
(Kurematsu 2013). These “small business associations” handle over 80% of the trainees 
coming to Japan, and as such have become the indispensible middlemen that connect 
workers to jobs. The field counts approximately 2000 supervising organizations that 
typically employ around ten people (see Kokusai Kenshū Kyōryoku Kikō 2011, 94-6). 
Though large employment firms are key actors in Taiwan, Japan does not see big 
companies in the business of dispatching trainees as most of this work, though registered, 
occurs in a legal gray area. The sizeable number of small-sized broker firms also 
contributes to difficulties in regulation enforcement.   
 
Program Implementation 
Entrance 
Formally, JITCO sits astride the cross-border connections to the sending area. It 
maintains partnerships with the sending states, which supervise their own field of brokers 
and employment agencies, or “sending organizations.” It is this level – the connection 
between the sending organizations and supervising organizations – that manages the nuts-
and-bolts of moving people across borders and connecting them to employers (see Tajima 
2010, 145-83; Kurematsu 2010, 68-78). The supervising organizations in Japan meet 
upon arrival the “trainee” workers, who have paid upwards of $9,000 to come to the 
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country. A portion of the fee may be transferred to the broker in Japan to cover the 
airfare, and typically part is held as a bond in the sending country to ensure return. In 
contrast to the broker-dominated system found in Taiwan, JITCO handles the entrance 
paperwork for the employers for a fee running between $50 and $100 per case.   
 
Program participation 
Once a migrant is in the job, brokers assume responsibility for the paperwork and 
maintenance requirements for a monthly fee of around $200, paid by the employer and 
typically extracted from the migrant‟s wages. As supervising organizations, the brokers 
are charged with auditing the employment sites yearly and establishing a training plan, as 
well as providing initial training, health insurance, and return travel. They are also 
required to supply continuing language support, counseling services, and adjustment 
help, though there is little incentive to do so and actual provision in these areas is spotty.  
JITCO rarely monitors the maintenance fees brokers charge, which include both 
“maintenance expenses” between $200 and $500 per month, and an annual $1000 in 
“placement expenses.” Migrants may face additional charges as well, and contracts can 
stipulate the fines levied for activities like complaining, sexual involvements, or 
exchanges with irregular migrants (Belanger et al. 2011, 47; on program violations see 
Yasuda 2013).    
 
Exit 
Like Taiwan, Japan has kept runaways low. Though the wages and work conditions are 
often better in the irregular labor market, only around 3% of participants illegally leave 
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the program annually, according to JITCO in interviews.
11
 A key deterrent might be the 
substantial bonds that recruitment agencies may hold in the sending country, which can 
range from $5,000 to $10,000 (Belanger et al 2011, 43; Yasuda 2013, 55-6). Though they 
are illegal under the program, JITCO reportedly encourages such “safety deposits,” and 
brokers regularly use them as well. A small bonus for return is the promise of pension 
refunds: the national government deducts pension costs from pay, as it does for all 
workers, which are refunded only upon documentation of the cancelled work visa 
obtained upon exiting the country.     
 
Resilience and Reform 
Violations within the program are rampant, yet sanctions rare.
12
 The Japan Civil Liberties 
Union and Japanese Lawyer‟s Association are highly critical of the program, which the 
UNHCR and U.S. Department of State has suggested amounts to “slavery” or “forced 
labor” in some cases (US Department of State 2014, 220-1; US Department of State 
2007, 125; Bustamante 2011, 10).
13
 Despite widespread abuse, only 0.5% of supervisory 
organizations were penalized for misconduct in 2009 (Watanabe 2010). Though courts 
                                                 
11
 The government estimated that about 60,000 visa over-stayers were in Japan in 2014 (Ministry of Justice 
2014, 77).   
12
 On program violations see Yasuda (2013), Hayakawa (2008), Gaikokujin Kenshūseikenri Nettowaaku, 
volumes 1 and 2 (2006), Kokusai Kenshū Kyōryoku Kikō (2011). 
13
  The US Department of State‟s Trafficking in Persons Report places Japan on its Tier 2 list and notes that 
its government “has not, through practices or policy, ended the use of forced labor within the TTIP [sic], a 
government-run program that was originally designed to foster basic industrial skills and techniques among 
foreign workers, but has instead become a guest worker program” (2014, 12).    
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have seen numerous cases involving named brokers, government officials continue to 
deny their existence and refer only to “supervising organizations.”  
 The program‟s origins in administrative adjustments, rather than new laws, has 
resulted in a hulking bureaucratic apparatus, many gray areas, and disrupted chains of 
responsibility.  As such, third parties face great difficulties in ensuring that decrees – for 
example that trainees have rights as workers – are applied in practice. The sustained 
denial that the de jure trainee program is a de facto guestwork scheme works through a 
set of fuzzy metaphors that limits the enforcement of migrant workers‟ rights, as 
observed from the outset (see Shimada 1994, 69-70, 76-7). The government likens the 
program to a scholarship system that allows the poor to access education through a “work 
abroad” scheme. Official newsletters tout experiences that broaden workers‟ horizons – 
opportunities to wear firefighter suits for the first time as they learn about fire safety or to 
attend cultural events like tea ceremony gatherings – or activities that will help them to 
“develop leadership” in unexpected fields like sewing piece-work. 14  In the face of 
rampant violations, JITCO maintains that it can only “guide” the program, and does not 
hold the authority to command the actors involved.  
 In the main, JITCO operates in a language of “human resource development,” and 
reforms adhere to this framework. In 2009, for example, NGO and international pressure 
led the government to alter the program, but it didn‟t address the human trafficking 
problems they raised. Rather, it focused on the training component, which was revised to 
allow participants who complete the first year of the program as “trainees” to move onto 
                                                 
14
Http://www.jitco.or.jp/english/activities_trainees_interns/2008/case1.html and 
Http://www.jitco.or.jp/english/activities_trainees_interns/2005/case13.html accessed February 1, 2015.   
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the second and third years under a new bureaucratic category of “technical interns.” 
Following the same logic of tinkering, the government is now planning to expand the 
program yet further. The revised “Revitalization Strategy,” issued in 2014, lists ten points 
to improve the economy and includes the increased intake of foreign workers among 
them. Citing labor shortages expected to result from the construction of Olympic 
facilities, the government is planning to expand the trainee program from three to five 
years and broaden its scope to include an additional 5,000 participants per year in 
construction. Notably absent from the media-driven debate about “the scramble for Asian 
workers” is discussion of JITCO and the function of trainees as workers. The silences, 
however, work in alignment with the wink-and-nod system, organized through the 
informal delegation of coordination tasks to brokers. 
 
South Korea 
In contrast to Japan and Taiwan, South Korea stands at the opposite end of the spectrum 
in its reliance on market mechanisms and private actors. The transformation, however, is 
recent and marks a dramatic shift from the broker-based temporary migrant worker 
program it initially implemented. Like its neighbors, the country saw growing numbers of 
irregular foreign workers as its economy took off in the late 1980s, and it instituted a 
low-paid labor migration program in 1991 to gain a handle on flows. The Industrial 
Training Program (ITP) took its cues from Japan in implementation and expansion. To 
run the local variant, the government set up the Korea International Training Cooperation 
Corps (KITCO), a conglomeration of business, labor, and government interests, 
dominated by the Korean Federation of Small Businesses (KFSB).  By the end of the 
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millennium, close to 300,000 labored on the program, largely in manufacturing and 
agriculture, for up to four years and ten months and with the option of extending once. 
  Skill development was the stated purpose of this “education program” for 
foreigners, yet as in Japan, the ITP operated as a thinly veiled guestwork scheme with 
participants allocated to undesirable jobs that typically required little training. The KFSB 
determined the sectors with the greatest need for foreign workers, and devolved the 
oversight of migrant selection and entrance to South Korea to the relevant business 
associations. Yet this did not eliminate a role for the migration industry. To implement 
the program, the government appointed twenty “delegation control agencies” – 
effectively for-profit brokers who connected the migrants selected in the sending country 
to employers in South Korea. As with the other cases in the region, employers and 
brokers left deposits with the government to ensure that migrants did not “run away.”  
However, these were set so low – $275 for employers and a mere $100 for brokers – that 
they failed to provide a overwhelming incentive to police participation (Yoo 2003). As an 
additional measure, KITCO established “consulting agencies” to offer employers advice 
on working with foreign trainees and preventing runaways (Seol and Skrentny 2004), but 
implementation too was outsourced to brokers, and their effectiveness in service 
provision was minimal. Observes of the system at the time suggested that it 
“institutionalize[d] and legalize[d] the „coyote‟ system that brings Mexican 
undocumented immigrants to the United States” (Seol and Skrentny 2004, 503). With 
migrants losing much of their paychecks to broker fees and debt payment, and with few 
recourses if problems arose on the job, and the number of ITP participants moving into 
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irregular work was large: between 30% and 60% of participants left the program for 
irregular work in any given year (Lim 2003; Kong et al. 2010, 259).   
 As with its Japanese counterpart, abuses ran high, and NGOs, civil rights and 
religious organizations, as well as a national union, repeatedly attacked the program for 
human rights violations and rampant corruption. By the late 1990s, a coalition of over 
eighty organizations called for greater government oversight as well as legal recognition 
of the trainees as workers – in short, a transformation from a dubious training program to 
a full-fledged, fully monitored guestwork scheme (see Kim 2003; 2005). Though the 
Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy stymied their 
actions repeatedly, the voices for reform found a supportive partner within the 
government when a former human rights lawyer, Roh Moo-hyun, took the presidency in 
2003. Allied with a strong executive, civil society groups were able to push through their 
programs for reform (Kim 2011). The fight left the KFSB so discredited that it renamed 
itself KBIZ.   
 The result was the 2004 Employment of Foreign Workers Act. A fundamental 
overhaul of the system, the Act transferred implementation of the labor program from the 
migration industry to the government. To prevent corruption and improve efficiency, 
program designers looked to Germany not a negative example for guestwork schemes, 
but as a positive model, and took inspiration from their state-managed programs that 
recruited Korean nurses and miners in the 1960s and 1970s. Crucially, the reforms 
replaced the private sector “delegation control agencies” that had matched workers to 
employers with a public enterprise, the Human Resources Development of Korea (HRD), 
located under the Ministry of Employment and Labor. Thus the new program removed 
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the layer of brokers and the competitive market in which they operated and built in its 
place a publically managed structure (Seol 2004). One official at the Ministry of 
Employment and Labor described the design in an interview as “like a planned economy, 
but one inside a capitalist system.” The resultant Employment Permit System (EPS) 
allows around 250,000 foreigners to work in the country for up to four years and ten 
months – two months short of the minimum time required for permanent residence – in 
small- to medium-sized firms. Over 75% labor in manufacturing, with smaller 
proportions in construction and agriculture. The Vietnamese are the largest group, 
accounting for 30% of participants, followed Filipinos, Indonesians, Thai, and Sri 
Lankans (Oh et al. 2012, 42-3). 
 
Program Implementation 
Entrance 
In the program‟s original design, HRD was to manage and implement the entire scheme, 
from determining labor market needs, to screening workers and matching them to 
employers. But the task of handling over 100,000 entrants per year outstripped its 
capacities, and soon after the program‟s inception, HRD partnered with KBIZ and the 
four related business associations (manufacturing, construction, fisheries and agriculture, 
and services) to assess which sectors required the extra hands. To ensure that brokers 
remain excluded from the Korean-side of the system, HRD continues to manage the 
international elements of the program, including the bilateral Memoranda of 
Understanding that the government holds with over one dozen sending countries. HRD, 
in connection with government-approved brokers abroad, selects candidates from a list of 
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available workers, concludes contracts before they depart from the sending country, and 
arranges transportation from the airport in Seoul to limit the participation of brokers in 
South Korea.  
 
Program participation 
In day-to-day implementation, private sector involvement is kept to a minimum. To 
manage the workers‟ stay, the Ministry of Employment and Labor contracts around forty 
NGOs to provide private consultations and assistance to foreign workers, including 
medical, legal, and linguistic support. In compensation, these non-profits receive direct 
money transfers from the government, which can constitute a substantial part of their 
operating budget. The contracts, however, are not opened to tender – reputation and 
connections, rather than market competition, determine the NGOs selected. Migrants also 
attend a battery of instructional programs upon arrival, which are taught by private actors 
based outside the migration industry. The government pays vocational institutes to 
provide the 16 hours of skills training required of all program participants. Though 
migrants, on paper, can change employers if problems appear on the jobsite, this rarely 
occurs in practice as transfers are possible only if the worker receives written permission 
from their current employer. Furthermore, contracts are renewed annually, and 
participants who do change employers are barred from extending their work beyond three 
years – further disincentives for labor market mobility.  
 
Exit 
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Monitoring exit has long been a problem in South Korea. Program reform has reduced 
the numbers of “runaways,” but not stemmed them.  The EPS abolished the deposits and 
withheld wages that, though ineffective, were intended to combat runaways under the old 
scheme. However, it did not institute substitute mechanisms. The market for irregular 
workers counts around 170,000, and those who leave the EPS and remain in South Korea 
account for about 45,000 of this figure – or nearly 20% of program participants (Oh et al. 
2012, 36, 42-3). The division of labor within the state works against draconian 
enforcement of exit. Though the Ministry of Employment and Labor favors deportation, 
only the Ministry of Justice can remove irregular workers, but it lacks both the will and 
the manpower to do so. Its Korean Immigration Service is in charge of deportation, but 
with only 1800 employees, the ratio of overstayers to officers is high. The police, too, are 
reluctant to become involved with deportation.   
 
Resilience and Reform 
Upon inception, South Korea‟s EPS program was applauded as a successful example of 
government reform of a competition-infused market for foreign workers managed by 
brokers. In interviews, bureaucrats within the Korean Labor Institute and the Ministry of 
Employment and Labor recognize that market mechanisms can provide efficient 
outcomes in some parts of the economy, but declare that they do not work for foreign 
labor programs. Perhaps most significantly, the move from the private to the public and 
non-profit sector has brought a decline in profitability for middlemen; migrants‟ debt has 
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more than halved from $3500 under the ITP to between $1200 (Yoon 2009) and $2800 
(Amnesty International 2014, 40; see also Amnesty International 2009, 26).
15
   
 However, the anti-broker goals of the program have not produced a unidirectional 
expansion of foreign workers‟ rights.  Indeed, this rhetoric has also been used to limit the 
labor market mobility of guestworkers. In the first years of the program, migrants seeking 
new employment could enter a job center run by the Ministry of Employment and Labor 
and access a book, written in Korean, of employers registered to hire migrant workers. 
Businesses complained that the system encouraged too much turnover, and in 2012, 
under the “Policy to Stop the Intervention of Brokers,” the system was ended on the 
grounds that brokers – often NGO workers who could read Korean, according to reports 
– were taking migrants en masse to find better jobs. Currently, a migrant dismissed by an 
employer cannot seek out new work, but must wait for a call from a new employer 
looking to hire.   
 
Visit and Employment Program 
Though the main source of foreign workers for undesirable jobs is the EPS, it is not the 
only guestwork-style program in the country.  Running parallel to it since its inception is 
a second scheme – the Visit and Employment Program (VEP) that channels co-ethnic 
Korean workers, largely Korean-Chinese, into semi-skilled jobs located a step above 
those filled by EPS participants. In function, it resembles a temporary work program, but 
                                                 
15
 Variation in the overall debt carried depends on sending country conditions as well.  The Indonesian 
government, for example, charges its nationals $5000 to work in South Korea, where the Nepalese 
government charges $1200.  
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in form it deviates greatly from the restrictions characteristic of guestwork schemes. Not 
the Ministry of Employment and Labor, as with the EPS, but the Ministry of Justice 
handles the VEP scheme. It maintains that the program‟s purpose is to aid Korean 
communities abroad, rather than recruiting labor, and takes a light hand in regulating 
labor market mobility (see Kim 2008).  Migrants on the scheme can work for up to four 
years and ten months  in any of 32 designated sectors largely representing semi-skilled 
jobs. Like South Korean citizens, they can enter any of sixty government-run job centers 
to find work, and most find employment in service and construction alongside Korean 
counterparts. As such, migrants are matched to employers through already existing public 
institutions that become the de facto instruments structuring their mobility on the 
program. Those discovered laboring illegally – that is, without registering with the 
government – face fines rather than deportation. With few entry and employment 
restrictions, Korean-Chinese have far more labor market freedom than their counterparts 
on the EPS. The Ministry of Justice does not investigate labor demand or allocate 
workers to specific sectors, as under the EPS. Thus it may be unsurprising that the 
Ministry of Employment and Labor has argued that VEP participants serve as substitutes 
for – rather than supplements of – native workers, sometimes undercutting their wages. 
Lobbying the Justice Ministry, it has succeeded in seeing the program capped at 300,000 
per year to minimize the impact on the local labor market.  
 Though the program operates with loose controls on labor market mobility, 
temporariness still defines it as a guestwork scheme. Yet even this has been eroded in 
recent years. The Ministry of Employment and Labor would prefer to channel VEP 
participants into sectors with greater labor needs than the service and construction jobs in 
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which they congregate, and the Ministry of Justice has agreed to allow ethnic Korean 
migrants who work in manufacturing or agriculture stay beyond their four year stint.  
Those who maintain an income on par with the national average can apply for permanent 
residence, and eventually citizenship (Seol 2012). Similarly, those who obtain college 
degrees are allowed to become permanent residents as well. As the government lifts 
limits on labor market mobility and the length of stay, elements of a scheme that once 
weakly operated for guestwork purposes are beginning to no longer functions as such.  
 
---------TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE-------- 
 
Discussion 
Of the cases examined, the Taiwanese state has gone furthest in devolving guestworker 
management to the migration industry and its brokers, yielding what might be termed a 
privately managed program that fits within quadrant I: formal delegation to for-profit 
actors. The government strategically uses competition, profit, and loss to ensure rigid 
control over the system, and it places few efficacious limits on the financial gains that 
labor brokers skim off migrants‟ wages. The result is a profitable and competitive 
business sector responsible for implementing the temporary labor migration program. 
Capital requirements and limits on the number of foreign workers determine the upper 
parameters of the field‟s size, and as a result, employers and brokers alike vie for limited 
access to labor. Though direct hiring is also an option, the extensive paperwork required 
to obtain and retain a guestworker serves as a disincentive that leaves many employers 
eager to rely on brokers rather than costly private lawyers., Furthermore, the substantial 
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deposits that brokers and employers leave with the government supply a powerful 
incentive that ensures that both parties remain vigilant police for the program known for 
its human rights violations. Not only the administration of the program, but its 
monitoring as well has become fully commercialized. The combination of profit-oriented 
competition and incentives yields a tightly managed system. As such, expansion is 
limited not by the program structure, but concerns for domestic labor, and growth over 
the past few years has been continuous.  
 In Japan, as in Taiwan, the control of temporary low-paid migrant workers is 
largely outsourced to private actors, but this occurs through a gray haze of evasive 
formulations. This unofficial collaboration between the two parties instantiates quadrant 
II: informal delegation to for-profit actors. Guestworkers are “trainees” offered 
“scholarship-like” chances for gaining experience in low-skilled jobs in which little 
training is necessary; employers are “implementing organizations” that provide paid 
educational opportunities; and brokers enter as “supervising organizations” that ensure 
that the program runs smoothly. The ambiguity dovetails with general policy of the 
Ministry of Justice, articulated in weaker terms by other actors, that low-paid migrants 
workers are not wanted and should not be allowed to enter the country. However, brokers 
operating for profit implement the bulk of the program, with the informal consent of the 
state. With relatively small numbers of migrants, the national government is able to 
ignore many emergent problems as it devolves the management of migrant-related issues 
to the regional or local level. Lack of will to enforce effective oversight of the trainee 
program leaves brokers to operate with great freedom, while lack of transparency has 
resulted in substantial human rights violations. This ad hoc arrangement – replicated by 
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South Korea‟s ITP stream – based on hazy procedural interpretations is less amendable to 
enlargement of the sort found in Taiwan.   
 South Korea‟s EPS offers the counterexample of de-marketization.  Here the state 
has reclaimed management of its temporary low-paid migrant worker scheme from the 
private sector to produce a publically discharged system that exemplifies quadrant III: 
formal delegation to non-profit organizations. Where brokers once operated for profit 
now stands a combination of public associations, government offices, and NGOs. The 
debt burden of migrant workers has decreased as well, as brokers within South Korea are 
less able to skim profits from their labor. The reforms, however, do not address other 
common sources of exploitation, including underpayment, overwork, unclear labor 
contracts, and excessive charges for accommodation (see Amnesty 2009; Amnesty 
2014)..  Yet the number of runaways has decreased – though without deposits, the tight 
control found in Taiwan is hardly matched. Employers call for changes that would allow 
for greater numbers of workers on longer contracts and with fewer rights, but the 
tarnished history of an official broker system has meant that current alterations must 
remain in line with the anti-broker rhetoric. If this does not prevent rollbacks entirely, it 
places a drag on deregulation.   
 The VEP, the companion program of the EPS, operates as a publically overseen 
scheme which falls within quadrant IV. The relationship between the state and the 
services that coordinate mobility for the program is informal; participants are able to rely 
on the facilities in place for nationals, and as such, no dedicated outsourcing is needed. 
Recent changes to the scheme also suggest that governments may be able to reverse 
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outsourcing to the migration industry. Not only may privitization be rolled back, but 
guestwork programs as well..  
 
Assessment 
The relationship between states and migration industries is more varied than the current 
literature suggests. The analysis shows that states may chose to work with for-profit and 
non-profit actors to implement labor migration schemes as an efficient management 
configuration, engaging their capability not only to control, but also facilitate movement. 
The result is a relationship of delegation as the state places the responsibility for ensuring 
effective policy implementation on the shoulders of others.  With this comes attendant 
risks and rewards that vary based on the form of contract connecting the state and the 
service providers, as well as the nature of the agent. The East Asian guestwork programs 
analyzed here instantiate four types of delegation relationship that can be applied more 
broadly.  
 
------TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE ------- 
 
 States may formally outsource program implementation to for-profit actors, 
yielding a privately managed system (quadrant I). For the state, the arrangement offers 
some benefits: delegating guestwork program implementation to private actors can allow 
it to claim efficiency gains and save resources that might otherwise be drained by 
migration policy enforcement. Taiwan‟s guestwork program exemplifies this 
configuration, through it can be found beyond the island. Hong Kong‟s system for 
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importing domestic workers operates in this way, with licensed employment agencies 
responsible for connecting migrant workers to employers and ensuring return (Verona 
2013), as do Singapore‟s temporary worker schemes (Teng 2014). The configuration has 
been used to implement seasonal agricultural work programs in recent years, as with 
Australia‟s Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme operated by “labor hire companies” 
(MacDermott and Opeskin 2010). And much of the labor migration to the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) states of the Middle East, carried out by licensed recruitment 
agencies, comes under this rubric as well (Agunias 2010, Rahman 2011). Though states 
may find that such arrangements serve their interests, they must still ensure that their 
agents execute policies effectively and guard against shirking or slippage (Dunleavy 
2011). In guestwork programs, exit is a key site where the interests may diverge. Labor 
brokers have little incentive to police migrants‟ return, yet a worker‟s stay must remain 
temporary for the program to operate as governments intend. A market-managed system, 
as found in Taiwan, can mitigate such risks as the state manipulates competition, as well 
as profit and loss incentives, to keep the agents in line.  A counter-example can be found 
in Israel, where manpower agencies regularly ferry guestworkers into the country with 
the promise of a job that never materializes. The result is large pools of unemployed – 
and simultaneously undocumented – labor. Client politics and kickbacks have prevented 
the government from bringing these employment agencies to heel (Kemp and Raijman 
2014), suggesting a case of agency slack. However, in ideal form, an explicit contract 
binds the principal and agent through licensing, which the principal can terminate should 
the agent deviate far. To hold labor brokers to task, the state can use market-based tools 
such as deposits, ratings systems, fines, and limits on the number of cases handled. The 
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observed result in Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and elsewhere is a closely managed 
and highly durable system with few runaways, if one that meets strong criticism from 
human rights organizations and NGOs for rights violations.  
 States may also opt for an alternative approach, based on an informal rather than 
formal delegation relationship (quadrant II). In such cases, the state allows the migration 
industry to become the de facto executor of its migration program. Not directly or 
specifically appointed to control migration flows per se, the agents possess greater 
autonomy and discretion in connecting workers to employers. The H1-B program in the 
US fits broadly into this category, as do some migration streams feeding the H2-B 
program (Griffith 2006). The “flying visa” system found across GCC countries operates 
along similar lines, in a gray zone outside official employment agencies. Unlicensed 
middlemen, often former migrant workers, secure visas from sponsors and subsequently 
rely on personal networks to find jobs for the workers they recruit (Rahman 2011, 
Aguinas 2010). In some cases, the liminal status leaves not only workers, but also brokers 
skirting the boundary between legality and illegality, which can inhibit the growth and 
expansion of such systems. In the Japanese case – as with South Korea before 2003 – 
brokers have not formed large firms of the sort that predominate in Taiwan, for example. 
The informal nature of the outsourcing thickens the corporate veil and evasive legal 
formulations can facilitate blame avoidance. As such, and in contrast to common 
principal-agent dilemmas, hidden information and hidden action are a boon, rather than a 
bane, for the principal (cf. Bessire 2005; Finkle 2005; Eisenhardt 1989). If unofficial 
collaboration programs have proven durable, their delicate balance of legality and 
illegality is likely to render them less expandable than counterparts with formal contracts. 
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 States may also delegate program management to non-profit and civic actors, both 
directly (quadrant III) and indirectly (quadrant IV). The involvement of non-profits 
mitigates the extent to which increasing financial gain serves as a motive for program 
implementers. Even if NGOs collect some budgetary funds from the government in 
exchange for their services, their purpose is not to turn a profit, and they are less likely to 
transfer costs onto the migrant.  Germany‟s post-war guestwork streams operated largely 
in this way until the practice of requesting migrants by name, combined with high 
demand, opened a path for informal brokers to organize flows (Faist 2000: 176-7).  
Similarly New Zealand‟s Working Holiday Maker Program, which is often – though not 
entirely – implemented indirectly through civic organizations, falls into this field as well. 
Public involvement is not a complete answer to some of the worst abuses that can mar 
guestwork programs. Even if delegation is based on a formal contract, the state may have 
little incentive to ensure that rights are protected and enforced if migrants are regarded 
solely as labor power. On occasion, privitization may even be reversed as evinced in 
South Korea‟s turn to publically overseen and publically discharged programs. More 
common is change in the other direction.  South Africa‟s guestwork program, channeling 
labor to its mines for the entirety of the twentieth century, was managed by the non-profit 
Witwatersrand Native Labour Association, renamed TEBA,, which projected itself as an 
“agent” of the state (Crush and Tshitereke 2001). In 2005  the government began to wind 
down the program and privatized TEBA – a shift from quadrant III to I. The US‟s 
Bracero Program exhibits a similar move towards privatization. Though public and civic 
actors initially implemented the program, over time for-profit “merchants of labor” began 
matching workers to employers informally (Galarza 1964) – a shift from quadrant III to 
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II. Because entrepreneurs are drawn to the profits mobility offers and often find 
compliant actors within government, a general trend from non-profit to private 
implementation is to be expected.   
 
Conclusion 
States have frequently delegated migration policy implementation to other actors, from 
the nineteenth century steamship companies that screened passengers before boarding 
(Zolberg 2006) to the private companies that run visa offices and detention centers today. 
Though the state, in ideal form, may have the final say over its cross-border flows, it can 
also find it more expedient to engage – or leave – other actors to manage them. The 
possible reasons are many, including limited infrastructural capacity, possible resource 
savings, claimed efficiency gains, and persuasive client politics. Yet little research has 
specified the dynamics involved when states outsource migration management to third-
party actors. Understanding these delegation relationships through a principal-agent 
framework can help identify the properties and stakes of common, yet distinct, 
configurations based on profit orientation and the nature of the contractual relation: for-
profit/formal, for-profit/informal, non-profit/formal, and non-profit/informal. This is not 
to suggest that these relationships are unique, static, or omnipresent. Countries do not 
always rely on a single delegation type – they may use different configurations for 
different programs – and the same program may encompass more than one configuration. 
Individual programs may shift over time as well, with a drift towards privatization 
common, driven by the profitability of mobility. Nonetheless, applying these heuristic 
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divisions to immigration policies sheds light on the risks and rewards of each 
configuration. 
 Several conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. The first concerns the 
spectrum of formality. When states formally outsource guestwork program 
implementation, direct intervention is easier should the agent fail to achieve the 
principal‟s goals. . As a formal arrangement, such systems are more readily expanded 
than informal outsourcing whose ad hoc configurations limit the state‟s ability to 
intervene through explicit manipulation of the arrangement. Yet it doesn‟t curtail the 
state‟s influence entirely: the state can always render informally entrusted employment 
agents illegal, for example, thereby shifting their operation and calculations. But on the 
whole, the “light touch” nature of indirect relationships is likely to yield more 
workarounds rather than direct intervention. The contrast is evident in the difference 
between Taiwan‟s formal delegation and Japan‟s informal outsourcing. 
 The delegation relationship can also vary based on the importance of financial 
profit. When working with non-profit agents, the state often retains greater control over 
elements of a migration program and the extent of delegation tends to be less. The reverse 
holds when states turn to private actors for program implementation. The extent of 
delegation is likely to be greatest – with third party actors overseeing all aspects of 
entrance, exit, and program participation – when the relationship between the state and 
migration industry actors is formal and commercial. Driving the trend are the promise of 
financial savings for the state and of financial gain for the migration industry. As 
migration management becomes commercialized, delegation and its challenges are likely 
to increase.  The difference is highlighted in the comparison of Taiwan and South Korea. 
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In the former‟s heavily privatized system, organized through formal channels, 
commercial operators and interests manage nearly all aspects of the program, including 
administration, monitoring, and implementation. In contrast, South Korea‟s formal 
partnerships with civic actors are crucial for coordinating the program, but less is 
outsourced, and the state retains control over migrant selection and utilizes public 
structures for job matching. In moving away from informal reliance on private actors 
under the ITP, the Korean government also moved many program elements in house.  
 Though it was beyond the scope of the paper to offer a causal explanation of the 
origins of different delegation relationships, a brief reflection on the historical 
development of the programs analyzed here suggests some considerations for future 
research. First, the sheer variety of outcomes points beyond the developmental state as 
the sole determinant of effects. In the Japanese case, the reforms in the 1990s were 
proceeded by unsuccessful calls by business for guestwork programs. In the early 1970s, 
they were stymied by key ministries. When businesses renewed demands for workers in 
the late 1980s, they converged with several new immigration policy debates and a new 
constellation of stakeholders lobbying for more open migration channels (see Chiavacci 
2011, Milly 2014). In response, the conservative Ministry of Justice, with the last say on 
migration policy, chose a cautious option: administrative reform of an existent channel. 
The result was a murky trainee scheme that has since operated as a de facto guestwork 
program. Taiwan and South Korea, in contrast, had been emigration countries under 
authoritarian rule until the late 1980s when they confronted the novel combination of 
irregular migration and strong business growth. Taiwan looked to Singapore as an 
economic role model and adopted a similar guestwork policy, while South Korea did the 
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same with Japan. It remains unclear whether the inter-ministerial jockeying of the sort 
seen in Japan played a role as well, or if the newness of the issue enabled a small set of 
bureaucrats to develop a policy in relative isolation. Either way, the imperatives behind 
policy choices appear mixed across the region. Though the results in Taiwan and Japan 
have remained resilient over time, South Korea saw radical revisions of its program. 
Behind these lay the conjuncture of a series of protests, building over years, and the 
election of an activist president. Such an outcome may also be possible in Taiwan, home 
to a presidential system and an activist scene. However, civil society pressure has not yet 
led to reform. 
 Taken as a whole, the factors and configurations affecting program development 
are many and would require historical research into a range of cases to isolate 
generalizable determinants. The present study suggests some elements that should be 
taken into account. These include the set actors involved in policy production and the 
relationships and power differentials among them, the history of failed attempts, the 
political opportunity structures available to civil society and other reformist movements, 
as well as the alternatives to formal guestwork programs for filling labor demands. The 
final point is crucial, though easily overlooked. A number of countries, such as Russia, 
have no need to develop formal guestwork programs for other, often irregular, migration 
streams provide a functional equivalent. The same exchange can be found within 
countries with guestwork programs as well. In Japan, for example, the inclusion of 
generous work permission clauses onto student visas have transformed educational 
opportunities for some students into a de facto work-abroad channel (Liu-Farrer 2009), 
which may reduce employer pressure on governments for expanded formal guestwork 
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channels.  A fuller comparative account of the origins and transformations of guestwork 
programs over time would need to incorporate such functional equivalents. 
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Table 1.  Basic Delegation Relationships  
 
  
Private Agent 
 
 
Non-Profit Agent 
 
 
 
Formal Contract 
I 
The state directly 
outsources responsibility to 
for-profit enterprises  
 
III 
The state directly 
outsources responsibility to 
non-profit enterprises 
 
 
Informal Contract 
II 
The state, de facto, 
devolves responsibility to 
for-profit enterprises 
 
IV 
The state, de facto, 
devolves responsibility to 
non-profit enterprises 
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Table 2.  Number of Guestwork Program Participants by Year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Taiwan  Japan  South Korea 
Total foreign 
workers in 
productive 
industries and 
social welfare 
Number of 
entering 
TITP 
participants 
Number of 
entering ITP 
participants 
Total EPS 
participants 
Total VEP 
participants 
1992  15,900    4,900   
1993      8,600   
1994    37,000  28,300   
1995  189,000  41,000  38,800   
1996    46,000  68,000   
1997    50,000  81,500   
1998  270,600  50,000  47,000   
1999    48,000  69,500   
2000    54,000  77,400   
2001  304,600  59,000  46,700   
2002  303,600  59,000     
2003  300,200  65,000     
2004  314,000  75,000   6,700 1,400 
2005  327,400  83,000   53,700 12,700 
2006  338,800  93,000   83,600 45,900 
2007  357,900  102,000   108,600 62,200 
2008  365,000  102,000   188,200 90,000 
2009  351,000  80,000   228,200 122,400 
2010  379,700  78,000   239,600 147,000 
2011  425,700  82,000   205,600 106,000 
2012  445,600  86,000     
2013  489,100  83,000     
2014  551,600       
2015  557,800       
 
Sources: (Taiwan) Ministry of Labor, Workforce Development Agency, 
http://www.statdb.mol.gov.tw/html/mon/i0120020620e.htm; (Japan) Ministry of Justice, 
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Immigration Control Report, various years; (South Korea) Ministry of Employment and 
Labor, 2011; Chun, 2014: 38. 
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Table 3.  Basic Delegation Relationships in East Asian and Other Guestwork 
Programs  
  
  
Private Agent 
 
 
Non-Profit Agent 
 
 
 
 
 
Formal Contract 
 
I 
Taiwan‟s guestwork program 
 
Singapore‟s guestwork program 
 
GCC‟s guestwork program 
(employment-agencies) 
 
Israel‟s guestwork program  
 
III 
South Korea‟s EPS 
 
South Africa‟s mining 
guestwork program (until 
2005) 
 
US‟s Bracero Program (early 
years) 
 
 
 
 
Informal Contract 
II 
Japan‟s TITP 
 
South Korea‟s ITP  
 
GCC‟s “flying visas”  
 
US‟s H1-B and H2-B Programs  
 
IV 
 
South Korea‟s VEP 
 
New Zealand‟s Working 
Holiday Maker Program 
    
 
 
